The critique of established policy procedures, which evolved from this research into questions concerning the monetary mechanism, is derived from a body of monetary theory referred to .. as the Monetarist position (emphasis addedi, 'l'hree major conclusions have emerged from the hypotheses put forth. Fir'st, monetary impulses are a major factor accounting for variations in output, employment and pr'ices. Second, movements in the money stock are the most reliable measure of the thr'ust of monetary impulses. Third, the behavior of the monetary authority dominates movements of the money stock over' business cyctes.
'the process of defining and refining what we now mean by monetarism grew out of a controversy that emerged in the laGOs regarding the relative importance of mnonetamy and fiscal impulses. The dominant economic policy fm'amework of the day was an outgrowth of the thinking of the 193Os, which became known as Keynesianism. The rapid growth of government spending associated with the Vietnam War, the Great Society pm'ograms and relatively large deficits in the federal gover-nment's budget were associated with conditions of rapid economic growth, rising inflation and a low unemployment rate. The political pr'escrption for' the problem of inflation was a surtax on personal and corporate incomes to restrain aggregate demand and m'eduee inflation Adherents to the propositions that became known as monetarism questioned whether' such fiscal actions would, in fact, restrain aggm'egate demand and reduce inflation if monetary growth remained as rapid as it had been previously. Since the dominant position of the time was known as the Keynesian revolution, the critics of that view were said to have mounted a monetarist counterrevolution. At times, the quality of the discussion was silly, including such insights as 'you can pull on a string, but you can't push on a string" and "you can lead a horse to water', but you can't make him drink." At other and more useful times, state-of-the-art econometric techniques were used to test rival conjectures about monetary and fiscal impulses.
The skirmishes of the period included the Friedman-Heller debate, the "Battle of the Radio Stations" -which referred to the reseam'ch done by Ando-Modigliani (AM) and Friedman-Meiselman (FM) Louis is now well-known in economics circles; although it had started a few years earlier', it was given greatly heightened visibility with the publication of the Andersen-Jordan (AJ) article in 1968.
The 1966 credit crunch and subsequent "minirecession" had demonstrated the potential for a r'estrictive monetary policy, measur-ed in terms of a deceleration of monetary growth, to dominate an expansive fiscal impulse. In 1968, the issue was whether monetary stimulus -as indicated by continued rapid growth of money -could dominate a restrictive fiscal impulse as measured by a tax incm-ease, reduction in the high employment deficit or some other' summary vamiable. The r'eseam'ch under-lying the Al article was motivated by two events: the Johnson admiriistration's anti-inflation sum-charge on personal and corporate income tax and the FOMC's decision to ease monetary policy to cushion the presumed highly r-estmictive effects of the tax sum-char-ge.
We considered the Al article to be a sequel to the FM article. Our purpose was to rigorously formulate potentially falsifiable hypotheses about various macroeconomic policy actions. The article also was an exer-cise in applying what was then state-of-the-ar't computer'-ized regression programs using the Almon distributed lag for testing hypotheses.
I believe that the vehemence of the attacks on the Al article arose from two sources. First, the results of the study sharply contradicted the inherited wisdom of the times and raised serious doubts about our ability to use aetivistldiserelionamy fiscal policy to influence the economy in predictable ways.
A second reason for the attacks was simply that the reduced-form approach used in the Al study repr-esented a threat to econometmic model builders; it provided a low-cost alternative to the expensive efforts at the time to build large-scale structural models of the U.S. economy. For example, around that time, the Federal Reserve Board had enter-ed into a contract to spend about $1 million to build what became known as the flTh-MIT econometric model. In my judgment, the structural model-builders of the times simply could not afford to leave unchallenged the competition that this relatively cheap approach presented in evaluating policy effects on the economy. In any event, those threatened by its challenge both to economic orthodoxy and to the usefulness of lam'ge-scale mnodels had great incentive to seek to discredit the Al methodology.
Thus, as the decade of the l960s ended, the lines had been drawn for a prolonged intellectual battle. The Keynesian revolution was still dominant, but the challenge of the monetarist counterrevolution had been initiated. The l970s was a decade of formulation, reformulation arid empirical testing of the alternative views of the major macroeconomic influences on the economy. By the end of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, fur'ther testing of monetarist propositions by actual implementation was attempted, at least in name, if not in fact.
Recently, there have been numerous claims that monetarism has failed. Certainly the case against monetansm has been tried in the press with joum-nalists acting as both prosecutors and jury. Economists, however, have yet to complete their deliberations, Because the "breakdown" of the Al results is often cited as evidence against monetarism, I would like to comment briefly on the current controversy.
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The failure of monetarism has been asset-ted and reasserted often during the past few year's. This failure is based on the contention that the relationship between money growth and GNP, or-money growth and inflation, has broken down. In particular, the behavior' of the income velocity of money over the last fewyears, especially in 1985, has raised questions about one of the central propositions of the quantity theory of money, or mnonetarism -namely, the stability of the demand function for money. The sham-p decreases and increases in conventionally measured velocity have led to assertions that the demand for money is unstable and, therefore, the money supply (Ml) is no longer a reliable indicator of the thrust of monetary policy impulses.
Growth rates of Ml over' short intervals during the last few years have been highly volatile, and the contemporaneously measured ratio of GNP/Ml also has fluctuated over a wide range. Unfortunately, both monetarists and their-critics seem to accept the view that the public policy relevance of monetarism depends on the short-ron stability of the functional relationship between domestic income and/or output and growth of the money supply. The short-run volatility of a data series such as the ratio GNP/MI, however, does not yield any definitive information about the stability of the underlying functional relationship between money and economic activity.
There are three important aspects of velocity behavior in the recent past that must be examined: the i-ole of institutional changes, the implications of lags and the appropriateness of the numerator in computing the velocity ratio, Some analysts assert that deregulation of the financial system, starting with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetamy Control Act of 1980 and continued with the Garn-St. Gem-main legislation in 1982, has alter-ed the behavior of Ml and, in tum-n, has caused the volatile behavior of velocity in the last two years. 'l'he empirical issue, on which there is no con-sensus at this time, is the degree to which the 'demand for money balances" has shifted upward relative to income or-wealth and, consequently, a downwar-d shift in at least the level, and possibly the trend growth rate, of Ml velocity.
It has been ar'gtred that the removal of Regulation Q interest ceilings on bank deposits and the innovation of new types of deposit instruments has resulted in Ml containing a lam-ge savings component. Therefore, faster gm'owth of the money supply, such as what occurred in 1985-86, should not be taken as an indicator of as much stimulus as before since the demand for' money balances is also rising. Without an excess supply condition, it is argued, ther'e is no reason to expect nominal income growth to accelerate.
Monetarists generally accept the view that deregulation and financial innovation have most likely resulted in a reduction in the tm-end rate of growth of Ml velocity. There is no reason, however, to believe that the level ofvelocity would be expected to decline. The trend rate of incmease of historic Ma velocity has been between 0 and 1 percent. Ma has always contained a melatively large savings component. Deregulation and innovation may have resulted in Ml taking on the characteristics of historic Ma. At this point, however, we do not have sufficient evidence to draw fir'm conclusions.
Even if Ml is now like old Ma, the trend rate of increase of Ml velocity wotrld have declined fr'om the 3 percent rate of the post-war period to something more similar-to historic Ma velocity gr-owth. Ther'e is no theoretical reason and no evidence to suggest that the trend of Ml velocity would be negative as a result of deregulation and innovation.
fl/c Role~(<ago
The existence of lags in an envir-onment of highly volatile short-m-un money growth must produce a highly volatile data series for-velocity, Volatility of the data ser-ies, however', does not yield useful information about the stability of the under-lying frrnctional r-elationship.
This point can be illustm-ated with a simple example. Suppose it were known with cettainty that the lag between changes in money and changes in nominal income was exactly 180 (lays. Suppose further that the growth of Ml accelerated and decelerated sharply over intervals lasting exactly six months. Starting fr-om any initial condition, a sham-p acceleration in Ml gm'owth for six months would not be matched by an acceleration in the growth of the numerator of the velocity ratio. Consequently, contemporaneously measured velocity (VI would decline during the interval.
At the end of six months, the numerator would begin to rise more rapidly, while the denominator decelerated, causing a sharp increase in the V-ratio. Six months later, once again the denominator' would accelerate while the numerator decelem-ated, causing a plunge in the V-r-atio. Observing the behavior of the Vratio over' sever-al such cycles could easily lead an undergraduate money-and-banking student to conclude that velocity, or-the demand for' money, was not stable. It was a perfectly stable and predictable functional relationship, however, that produced the volatility of the data ser'ies.
The relevance of the point is that, over' the last several years, we have observed increasingly sharp accelerations and deceler-ations of Ml growth, with each movement in the rate of change tending to last two to three quar-ters followed by a sharp reversal. Since the real-world lag is not discrete, but rather is distributea and variable, the challenge to empirical research is to develop techniques to identify the actual lag struetur'e.
It is common practice to compute the velocity of money as the ratio of GNP divided by Ml or a broadermoney measure. The original quantity theory equation, however, was MV = PT, where T is transactions. Changes in GNP reflect primarily changes in domestic output at prevailing prices, not total transactions at prevailing prices. 'the use of GNP in the velocity ratio implies both a closed economy and the stability of such components as business inventories. Since those assumptions are not a good representation of the real won-Id, the use of GNP for-computing velocity causes sever-al problems.
In casual conversation, it is common to refer to GNP as a measur-e of aggr'egate demand or total spending in the economy. It is not. A rigom-ous formulation of the quantity theory of money, or monetatism, involves a statement about the demand for-money balances r'elative to wealth or-permanent income. Since quam-teriy fluctuations in GNP as compiled by the Commerce Depar'tment at-c not a good proxy for-changes in wealth or-permanent income, the use of GNP to compute the inver-se of the demand for money -velocity -causes significant measurement problemns.
'i'he theory implies that an acceleration in monetary growth r-esults in inereased spending gr-owth. In a closed economy, a short-run manifestation of the incm-eased spending would be an involuntary and unanticipated reduction in business inventories, increased ordering and increased production. The longer-term effect is a reduction in the purchasing power of nominal money units -inflation.
In an open economy, an increase in money gr-owth may be accompanied by an increase in demand for imported goods as well as domnestic-ally produced output. A sharp and sustained acceleration of money gm-owth that is accompanied by a large increase in imports suggests a decline in the GNP/MI r-atio, at least for' a while. Other adjustments, however, gradually do take place -such as in the foreign exchange value of the domestic currency which changes the relative prices of internationally traded output; eventually more costly imports and more competitive exports will reverse the situation. Those lags can be very long and are difficult to predict, introducing further uncertainty into the m-elation between money and GNP growth. 'Fhis phenomenon limits the usefulness of monetanism in conducting short-run-oriented discretionary policies since the usefulness of money gr-owth as an indicator of the thrust of monetary policy is usually gauged in terms of its reliability in fom-ecasting GNP growth. One centr-al monetarist proposition has always been that activist, discretionary policies are neither-necessary nor desirable. Therefore, it is imonic that the "St. Louis equation" umtintentionally strengtliened the views of the public policymaker-s who wanted to "manage" monetary policy to achieve different economic r'esults. The empirical relatiomi between money gr-o~vthand nominal income was used as a rationalization fom-an activist, discretionary policy under' which faster-or' slower target gr-owth r-ates for-mnoney were adopted to achieve faster or-slowem' growth r'ates of nominal GNP and, in turn, more or less inflation, output and employment.
The use of the St. Louis equation to engage in 'finetuning" was neithem-intended nor' anticipated by us. As I noted eaniier-, our' intent was to demonstrate that expansive monetary fine-tuning, intended to offset a presumed contractionary fiscal impact, was neithernecessary nor-desirable. Much to our surprise and chagrin, our' results were used by some to demonstrate the efficacy of monetary fine-tuning.
The basic pr'oblemn with activist policies is that numerous factom's affect economic per-for-mance; in the past two decades, there have been ample oppor-tumiities to accumulate data about the effects of 1)0th policy and non-policy developments on economnic activity. Yet, very little, if anything, has been lear-ned fr-om all this accumulated exper-ience. The lags in the effects of policy actions are just as variable and just as uncer--tam, and policy actions still account for-less than half the variability of economic vaniahles.
The appendix to the Ander-sen-Jor-dan ar-tide emphasizes the impor-tance of the "Z-faetor-," a variable summarizing all the other-forces that influence total spending in the economy. While the text of the an'ticle concluded that monetary policy actions wer-e melatively more important than fiscal actions, the analysis in the appendix suggests that a more coniplete conclusion would have been "and non-policy factors are even mor-e impom'tant." The ar-tide's impact on economic policymaking would have been more favor-able had it not led to an increased reliance on monetary over fiscal policy, but had it instead contr-ibuted to a general de-emphasis of fine-tuning attemnpts by policymakens. Some of the frustr-ation and disappointment expressed by monetary policymaker-s in recent yeam-s may have resulted from the unsatisfactony results they observed from this misuse of the theory.
In my judgment, the enduring contribution of the A.) approach is the methodology employed to assess the differential impacts of policy actions on the economy, not the specific results offer-ed at the time. While institutional and technological changes oven' time may alter empirical results, students of public policy debates can still usefully apply today the singleequation, r'educed-lorm approach used by the AJ study 18 year-s ago.
